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Abstract
A number of studies suggest that the Europeanisation process is having a profound impact on national
labour market policies. Nevertheless, rather little research has been devoted to the development of
social assistance schemes across countries andover time. Relying on two new indicators, benefit levels
and replacement rates, we examined the relationship between the Lisbon Strategy and changes in
national social assistance benefits.We found no robust results for the first years of the Lisbon Strategy.
However, after its re-launch in 2005, therewas a positive association between the Lisbon Strategy and
social assistance benefit levels. In addition to the Lisbon Strategy, domestic political, institutional and
several economic factors were significantly associated with social assistance benefits.
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Introduction
Europeanisation can be defined as the impact of European integration on member states (Radaelli
2002). More specifically, it refers to the impact on policies, polities and politics. In the field of
social policy, the process of Europeanisation has been visible since the introduction of the Lisbon
Strategy. After the Lisbon Summit in 2000, the fight against poverty and social exclusion has
become one of the central tenets in the modernisation of the European social model (European
Council 2000a). A number of studies show that the Europeanisation process has triggered or
contributed to domestic labour market policy reforms (Armingeon 2007, Paetzold and Van Vliet
Corresponding author:
Olaf van Vliet, Department of Economics and at the Institute of Public Administration, Leiden University.
E-mail: o.p.van.vliet@law.leidenuniv.nl
European Journal of Social Security
2018, Vol. 20(3) 253–271
ª The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1388262718798896
journals.sagepub.com/home/ejs
EJSS
2014, Swank 2011, Van Vliet and Koster 2011). Nevertheless, relatively little research has been
devoted to the relationship between the Lisbon Strategy and domestic social assistance policy
reforms. This is remarkable as these benefit schemes play a central role in combating poverty and
the pursuit of social inclusion. As the last-resort safety net, social assistance benefits are important
instruments for providing social protection, which was emphasised by the Lisbon Council
(European Council 2000a). Furthermore, since the European coordination of social policy is still
based on legally non-binding means of governance, it is important to acquire insight into the
domestic impact of the Lisbon Strategy.
In this study, our aim was to complement the existing literature by exploring the Europeanisa-
tion of national social assistance policies. However, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the
Lisbon Strategy has contributed to domestic social assistance benefit reforms.
Assessing the impact of the European strategy might be over-determined due to its non-binding
character (Zeitlin 2009). Hence, the aim of this study was to analyse changes in social assistance
benefits after the launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 and its re-launch in 2005, and to explain the
cross-national variation in benefit policy changes, accounting for several political, economic and
institutional factors.
We seek to make three contributions with this article. First, existing Europeanisation studies
have focused on the Lisbon Strategy that was launched in 2000. In 2005, the governance structure
was modified in order to increase its effectiveness and the strategy was then re-launched. This
study accounts for this re-launch. Second, the empirical analysis is based on two new indicators for
comparing the levels of social assistance benefits across countries and over time, namely, net
benefit levels and net replacement rates (Wang and Van Vliet 2016b). Third, the analysis of the
determinants of benefit levels in welfare state programmes such as unemployment benefits has
been a central subject in the comparative political economy literature (e.g. Allan and Scruggs 2004,
Korpi and Palme 2003). Nelson (2013a) and Van Vliet and Wang (2017) have examined the
determinants of social assistance benefits. With regard to these two studies, the contribution of
the current study is that it includes the role of EU coordination in the analysis.
Europeanisation of social assistance benefits
Social assistance benefits
Social assistance benefits are public transfers that are aimed at helping households obtain an
adequate standard of living which employ a low-income criterion as the central entitlement
condition (Adema 2006, Immervoll et al. 2015). Because this broad definition encompasses several
low-income programmes, such as child supplements and tax credits, in addition to basic allowan-
ces, the terms ‘social assistance’ and ‘minimum income’ benefits are used interchangeably in this
article. Depending on the specific structure of the welfare state, social assistance generally func-
tions as a last-resort safety net. That is, eligibility for social assistance arises if eligibility for other
transfers has been exhausted. Social assistance benefits have developed considerably over the past
few decades (Van Mechelen and Marchal 2013). Nearly all OECD countries have minimum
income schemes for households that do not have sufficient other resources to support themselves
(Adema 2006). In addition, combating poverty and providing income protection have been central
objectives of the European social policy coordination and integration processes (European Council
2000a). Since the 1990s, minimum income protection has been a recurrent theme of the EU
governance in combating poverty and social exclusion (Vandenbroucke et al. 2013).
254 European Journal of Social Security 20(3)
In the welfare state literature, the effectiveness and efficiency of low-income targeting in
reducing income inequality and financial poverty have been extensively studied (Smeeding
2006). Recent studies show that in many European countries the levels of social assistance benefits
are not adequate to lift households out of poverty (Figari et al. 2013, Ho¨lsch and Kraus 2006,
Marchal et al. 2014, Nelson 2010, Nelson 2013a, Van Mechelen and Marchal 2013, Wang and Van
Vliet 2016a).
Lisbon Strategy 2000
In 1992, the European Council suggested that Member States should recognise ‘the basic right of a
person to sufficient resources and social assistance to live in a manner compatible with human
dignity’ under Recommendation 92/441/EEC (European Council, 1992). This recommendation set
out common criteria to ensure adequate social assistance. Together with other recommendations,
the 92/441/EEC Recommendation was an important step in the evolution of a European agenda
against poverty and social exclusion (Anderson 2015).
A new impetus was given at the European Council of Lisbon in March 2000. On this occasion,
the Lisbon Council incorporated social inclusion as something intrinsic to the overall strategy of
the Union, setting an ambitious goal for the EU ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and
better jobs and greater social cohesion’ during the period 2000–2010 (European Council 2000b,
p.2). As such, the Lisbon Strategy was a turning point in the discourse on the social dimension of
the European integration process. Its ambition was to ensure that each citizen can count on basic
rights and adequate resources (Ferrera et al. 2002). Later, in December 2000, the Nice European
Council approved a set of objectives for the fight against poverty and social exclusion. In this
respect, social assistance was considered as an essential safety net for the most vulnerable groups
in society (European Council 2000a).
The Lisbon Strategy was based on an intergovernmental means of EU governance, the Open
Method of Coordination (OMC). The OMC has been applied to several policy fields, such as
employment and education. At the Lisbon summit, the European Council extended the OMC to
cover a wide range of social policy areas, including social inclusion and the modernisation of social
protection systems (Barcevicˇius et al. 2014). For the coordination of social policies, OMC Social
Inclusion was created. Leaving the responsibility for social policy to policy-makers at national
level, it proposes legally non-binding guidelines, national action plans, peer reviews, joint evalua-
tion reports and recommendations (Ferrera et al. 2002). That is, member states agree on a set of
non-binding common objectives, prepare national action plans on a regular basis to meet these
objectives, the European Commission then evaluates these plans and publishes them in Joint
Commission/Council reports, and social indicators are defined to allow for performance monitor-
ing and frame convergence (Daly 2008). The social indicators encompass, among other things,
financial poverty, income inequality and long-term unemployment. As such, the OMC intends to
disseminate best practices and achieve greater convergence towards the Lisbon goals.
Lisbon Strategy 2005
Evaluations and case studies showed that the actual impact of the Lisbon Strategy was rather
limited (Zeitlin et al. 2005). After five years, a mid-term evaluation of the Lisbon Strategy
indicated that its outcome was rather disappointing (European Council 2005). An overly complex
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structure, multiple goals and actions, and an unclear division of responsibilities and tasks were
responsible for the limited effectiveness of the Lisbon Strategy in its early years (European
Commission 2010). In response to this critical evaluation, the Lisbon Strategy was re-launched
by the Barroso Commission in 2005. First, a stronger EU framework was developed. In this revised
strategy, the most important change was the procedural re-organisation into three main steps,
namely, defining a series of European integrated guidelines, implementing these guidelines
through national reform programmes, and monitoring the progress country by country (Borra´s
and Radaelli 2011). Following these changes, the roles of the Commission, the Council and the
member states have been redefined and have become clearer (Barcevicˇius et al. 2014).
Second, compared with the broad ranging Lisbon Strategy 2000, the objectives of the Lisbon
Strategy 2005 on social inclusion were narrowed: ‘Ensure the active social inclusion of all by
promoting participation in the labour market and by fighting poverty and exclusion among the
most marginalised people and groups, guarantee access for all to the basic resources, rights and
social services needed for participation in society . . . .’ (European Commission 2005).
Third, the OMCs in the fields of social inclusion, pensions and health and long-term care were
streamlined and interdependent policy areas were integrated into a new Social OMC. The intention
of this institutional change was that synergies could be generated and that complex challenges
could be approached more effectively (Barcevicˇius et al. 2014).
Overall, the influence of the OMC can be defined either as substantive or as procedural, mainly
through the mechanisms of peer pressure, mutual learning, socialisation, discursive diffusion,
creative appropriation and external support (De la Porte and Pochet 2002, Hamel and Vanhercke
2009, Weishaupt 2014b). Substantive influence refers to shifts in actors’ positions or the weights
they put on particular issues, or shifts in the legislated, administrative or organisational rules and
practices. Procedural impact can be understood as the enhancement of horizontal coordination and
integration between interdependent policy fields, enforcement of vertical coordination between
levels of governance, rising involvement of non-state actors and subnational actors, and improve-
ment in national steering and statistical capacities (Weishaupt 2014b).
Both substantive and procedural effects have been found in Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain
and the United Kingdom. In Denmark and Germany, the OMC has had mainly substantive effects
and in Italy mainly procedural effects have been found (Weishaupt 2014b). For instance, in
Belgium, procedural influences included building statistical capacity, adopting national and sub-
national poverty targets, promoting both horizontal coordination in the Brussels region and vertical
coordination by including non-governmental stakeholders. Substantively, the OMC exerted impor-
tant leverage effects to justify raising the levels of minimum income benefits for the elderly poor
(Vanhercke 2014). In Italy, the Social OMC contributed to the launch of a series of surveys and
studies on homelessness and poverty conditions, which were aimed at developing adequate ser-
vices for the most vulnerable people for social insertion (PPMI 2011: 120). In Denmark, the Social
OMC has placed and maintained the issue of poverty on the political and public agendas and
ideational and policy exchange percolated through to the development of homelessness strategies
(De la Porte 2014).
Case studies of countries like Germany and Belgium show that the effects of the Social OMC
have actually been more visible since 2005 (Weishaupt 2014a, Vanhercke 2014). After the re-
launch of the Lisbon Strategy, governance instruments of the Social OMC, such as common
objectives, monitoring based on common indicators, mutual learning process and reporting on
progress, have been functioning more adequately (Barcevicˇius 2014). Therefore, in line with these
observations, we hypothesised that the Lisbon Strategy has been positively associated with the
256 European Journal of Social Security 20(3)
developments of national social assistance benefit schemes and we expected the upward trend to be
greater after 2005.
Hypotheses on domestic politics, institutions and socioeconomic
developments
Domestic politics and institutions
Case studies show that the influence of the OMC varies across the member states, depending on a
country’s domestic institutional and political situation (Weishaupt 2014b). In the comparative
political economy literature on welfare states, partisan preferences are traditionally considered
to play an important role in the explanation of policy reform. The general proposition is that left-
wing parties are more in favour of generous social transfers than are right-wing parties (Allan and
Scruggs 2004, Korpi and Palme 2003, Potrafke 2016, Swank 2013). In line with this literature, we
expect left-wing parties to be positively associated with social assistance benefit levels.1 Yet,
Jessoula et al. (2014) recently argued that left- and right-wing preferences might differ from the
general proposition. Left-wing parties may be more likely to support broader (occupational) social
insurance programmes rather than social assistance benefits, and right-wing parties might support
social assistance benefits over social insurance programmes, as a less expensive programme to
help those harmed by market failures.
Similarly, trade unions are considered as important actors in welfare state reforms in the sense
that they are strong defenders of social insurance programmes (Rueda 2007, Starke 2006). This
also applies to the domestic impact of the OMC Social Inclusion when social partners are consulted
in the policy-making processes (Jacobsson and Johansson 2009). Hence, we expect a positive
association between the strength of trade unions and social assistance benefits.2
Furthermore, political institutions are often considered as relevant factors in welfare state
reforms. A proportional representation electoral system provides more institutional opportunities
for parties with egalitarian policy goals to resist benefit cuts (Swank 2002). Therefore, it can be
expected that proportional representation electoral systems are positively related to social assis-
tance benefit levels.
Socioeconomic developments
In addition to Europeanisation and domestic political institutions, the comparative welfare state
literature indicates that reforms may also be triggered or affected by a number of socio-economic
developments. High levels of unemployment lead to higher expenditures on unemployment and
social assistance benefits. The resulting budgetary pressure may trigger social assistance benefit
reform. Thus, it can be expected that unemployment levels will be negatively associated with
social assistance benefit levels (Brady and Lee 2014, Korpi and Palme 2003). Furthermore, GDP
1. A limitation of this study at the country level is that the partisan composition of regional governments (in federal states)
is not taken into account.
2. Nevertheless, recently Clegg (2014) argued that an interesting difference between social assistance benefits and other
welfare state programmes is that in many countries trade unions have institutionalised channels of influence in labour
market policy reforms as they are involved in the organisation of employee insurances, whereas they have no formal
responsibility in the provision of minimum income protection.
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per capita is a frequently used variable in the welfare-state literature. According to Wagner’s law,
more economically developed countries have more generous social protection systems (Meltzer
and Richard 1983). Welfare state reforms may also be influenced by globalisation. There are two
central hypotheses regarding the relationship between globalisation and welfare state reform.
According to the efficiency hypothesis, governments implement efficiency-oriented reforms in
order to offer attractive conditions for firms (Garret and Mitchell 2001). In contrast, the compen-
sation hypothesis states that governments expand welfare states to compensate people who face
increased economic risks as a result of globalisation (Rodrik 1998). In addition to the effects of
globalisation, increased economic risks may also stem from structural changes on domestic labour
markets (Iversen and Cusack 2000). Thus, we tested the hypothesis that deindustrialisation is
positively related to social assistance benefits.
Data and methods
Dependent variable
The dependent variable of this study is the change of social assistance benefit levels. We
relied on two indicators to measure these benefit levels (Wang and Van Vliet 2016b). First,
we used the real net benefit level, which is a relatively straightforward measure of the
generosity of social assistance benefits (Olaskoaga et al. 2013). Data on benefit levels were
taken from the Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset (SaMiP,
Nelson 2013b).3 Net minimum income benefits are defined as the net income from a benefit
package consisting of basic social assistance, child supplements, refundable tax credits and
other benefits.4 These benefit levels are expressed in US dollars, adjusted for Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP, each year PPP for the United States is equal to 1) and inflation (CPI
2005¼100), which enabled us to compare benefits across countries and over time. Data on
PPPs were taken from the Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2012) and for the CPI we used
data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2012).5
3. The SaMiP database is in particular well suited for analyses of relatively long periods. Given the detailed simulations,
the CSB-MIPI database and the OECD’s Benefits and Wages-dataset provide more information on the generosity of
minimum income benefits from a cross-section perspective. For instance, SaMiP is focused on general means-tested
benefits, whereas CSB-MIPI looks at benefits for the able-bodied in particular. For an excellent comparison of the
characteristics of the different datasets, see Van Mechelen et al. (2011). An important advantage of the SaMiP database
for our study is that it contains annual data from 1990 onwards, whereas CSB-MIPI and the OECD data start in the
2000s.
4. One-time social assistance payments to cover unexpected and urgent needs or regular supplements to cover exceptional
needs are not included in this benefit package. Also, the coverage rate of social assistance benefits is not included,
because internationally comparable information is not available for a longer period.
5. An additional step is required for the Eurozone countries, as the PPPs in the years before the introduction of the euro are
also expressed in euros, whereas the benefit levels are expressed in the national currencies. For the Eurozone countries,
the real benefit levels are calculated as follows: real minimum income benefit ¼ ((minimum income benefit/exchange
rate from euro to national currency)/PPP) *(100/CPI). To convert the national currencies into euros, the study relies on
exchange rate data from the European Commission (2014). For the non-Eurozone countries, real benefit level ¼
(minimum income benefit/PPP)*(100/CPI). Note that CPI and PPPs do not work well to correct for price differences for
a consumption pattern corresponding to a low income. Using CPI and PPPs allows us to compare minimum income
benefit levels across countries and over time.
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As a second indicator, we used the net minimum income replacement rate to examine the
generosity of social assistance benefits relative to the wages in a country.6 This measure is defined
as the ratio of the net benefit level to the net average production worker wage. The net average
production worker wage refers to the in-work wage after deducting taxes. As such, this minimum
income replacement rate is constructed in a similar way as, and thus is comparable to, unemploy-
ment benefit replacement rates (Allan and Scruggs 2004, Van Vliet and Caminada 2012).
For both the real benefit level and the replacement rate, we took the simple average of the
indicators calculated for three household types: single persons, lone parents with two children, and
households with two parents and two children.7 In the sensitivity analyses, we tested our hypoth-
eses for each family model separately.
Explanatory variables
To examine the development of national social assistance benefits since the Lisbon Strategy, we
followed the approach used in empirical studies on the relationship between European coordina-
tion and national labour market policies, namely dummy variables (e.g. Armingeon 2007, Swank
2011). First, we included a variable that captures the effect of the Lisbon Strategy 2000. Specified
as a dichotomous variable, it is scored 0 for EU countries for the years before 2000 and 1 for the
years afterwards. As a second Europeanisation variable, we included a dichotomous variable that is
scored 0 for the EU countries before 2005 and 1 afterwards (2005 – 2009) to assess the impact of
the revised Lisbon Strategy. Hence, this dummy variable not only captures changes in the year
directly after the re-launch, but also in later years.8
To examine the role of domestic politics and trade unions in social assistance benefit reforms,
we included the percentage of total cabinet posts held by left-wing parties and union density,
respectively. Data for left-wing parties and union density were taken from the Comparative
Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2012). To account for the variation in national electoral
institutions, we included a dummy variable, scored 1 for a proportional representation system and
0 otherwise. Data were derived from the Dataset of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001).
To account for the constraining effect of unemployment on social policy budgets, we used
unemployment rate data from the World Development Indicators Dataset (World Bank 2012). For
GDP per capita, we relied on the Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2012). In addition, we used trade
openness and capital openness measured as a percentage of GDP to control for the effects of
economic openness of a country, relying on data from the World Development Indicators Dataset
(World Bank 2012). Finally, Iversen and Cusack’s (2000) measure of deindustrialisation was
constructed based on data from the OECD Labour Statistics (2015).
6. It should be noted that there are several other aspects to generosity such as eligibility criteria, work requirements,
changes in means tests.
7. These are the household types for which data is available. Ideally, one would use a weighted average of the household
types, as the representativeness of the household types varies across countries and over time. Unfortunately, such
information is not available. Recently, the OECD has published the Social Benefit Recipients Database but the data for
social assistance benefit recipients are only available for the period 2007-2012 for lone parents (OECD 2016).
8. We also ran the regressions with different cut-off-years: 2001 and 2006 instead of 2000 and 2005. The results are
comparable, although the significance levels are lower (results available upon request).
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Method
Identifying the role of the Lisbon strategy in domestic policy-making is a methodological chal-
lenge. This relates to the more general issue in Europeanisation research of isolating the impact of
European integration from national and global dynamics, which essentially comes down to the lack
of a counterfactual (Haverland 2007). Following earlier studies, (Armingeon 2007, Paetzold and
Van Vliet 2014, Swank 2011, Van Vliet and Koster 2011) our approach to this issue entails a
comparative analysis based on pooled time-series-cross-sectional data. To control for global trends
in social assistance benefits, a group of seven non-EU countries – Australia, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, the United States – are included, in addition to 14 EU countries:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. Furthermore, as discussed above, a number
of variables are included to control for domestic dynamics. The main advantage of this approach
(for instance compared to a case-study design) is that it utilises considerable variation that stems
from the large number of countries and years. In addition, it enables us to systematically control for
domestic factors. This combination provides leverage for identifying any impact of the Lisbon
Strategy. The main limitation of this approach (for instance compared to a case-study design) is
that it does not rely on detailed information on policy processes.
The year 1990 was taken as the first data year because earlier data on social assistance benefits
were not available. The analysis ends in 2009 because this is the last year of the Lisbon Strategy. Its
successor, the Europe 2020 Strategy, was launched by the Commission in 2010. As this coincides
with the peak of the economic crisis, it is not really possible to distinguish the impact of Europe
2020 on domestic social policy reform from the impact of the crisis. Therefore, Europe 2020 was
not included in the analysis. Given the fact that Eastern European countries entered the EU in 2004
2007 and 2013, there is little or no time-variation in the Lisbon Strategy variables in these
countries. Thus, Eastern European member states were not included in the analyses.
To analyse the data, the study employed an error correction model (ECM). This is a conventional
estimator in comparative political economy studies on welfare state reform (e.g. Ansell and Gingrich
2013, Busemeyer 2009, Iversen and Cusack 2000, Swank 2011). Because an ECM can be used for
stationary and integrated data alike, it is capable of overcoming issues of unit roots (De Boef and
Keele 2008). Moreover, models relying on level variables only are said to be prone to high levels of
autocorrelation, whereas ECMs proved to tone down this effect (Podesta` 2006). Since an ECM
stipulates that both the dependent and a number of the independent variables are measured as first
differences, our model accounts for issues of stationarity and autocorrelation, two problems that often
make pooled time-series cross-section regression complicated (Kittel and Winner 2005). In an ECM,
first-differences of the dependent variable are regressed on the lagged level of the dependent variable
and on both the first-differences and the lagged levels of the independent variables. Short-term
transitory effects are captured by the first differenced variables and long-term structural effects are
captured by the lagged levels (De Boef and Keele 2008). Our estimations took the following form:
DYi;t ¼ a þ bYi;t1þ
X
djXji;t1þ
X
U
j
DXji;tþ ei;t ð1Þ
Here, a refers to the intercept. D Yi,t stands for the changes in the dependent variable in country
i and year t.9 Yi,t-1 represents the lagged levels of the dependent variable. The first differences and
9. To correct for the (possible) effect of the absolute levels of the minimum income benefits, we also ran models in which
the benefit levels were transformed into logarithms. The results were robust (available upon request).
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lagged levels of the explanatory variables are expressed by DXi,t and Xi,t-1 respectively and ei,t is
the error term.10
Panel-corrected standard errors were used to correct for panel heteroscedasticity and contem-
poraneous spatial correlation (Beck and Katz 1995). The main regressions did not include fixed
effects, as a dynamic model may generate inconsistent estimations in that case (Nickell 1981).
However, fixed effects models are presented here as robustness checks.
Empirical results
Trends in the minimum income indicators
Table 1 presents the developments in the real levels of annual net minimum income benefits and of
net minimum income replacement rates over the period 1990–2009.11 The data show that the
minimum income benefit levels vary substantially across countries. In 2009, the highest benefit
levels could be observed in Luxembourg, followed by Japan, Denmark, Ireland and Italy. Portugal,
Spain and the United States are the countries with the lowest benefit levels. Remarkably, between
1990 and 2005, the average benefits were higher in the non-EU OECD countries than in the EU
countries. In 2009, however, benefit levels were on average higher in the EU countries than in the
non-EU countries.
The data show considerable variation over time. In most countries, benefit levels were raised in
real terms between 1990 and 2009, implying that the increase in benefit levels exceeded that in
consumer prices. The largest increases occurred in Luxembourg, Japan and Denmark. Meanwhile,
there are also several countries where benefit levels were reduced in this period. The sharpest
decrease can be observed in Spain, followed by Finland. Interestingly, for both country groups, the
benefit levels on average decreased before 2000. However, after 2000 and especially after 2005,
the benefit levels began to show substantial increases.
As is the case for benefit levels, the replacement rates vary considerably across countries. In
2009, Luxembourg and Italy had the highest replacement rates, while the United States had the
lowest replacement rate. In most countries, replacement rates declined during the 1990s. In the EU
countries, replacement rates rose in particular after 2005.
For most countries, the real benefit levels and the replacement rates showed parallel develop-
ments. However, in Australia, Belgium and the Netherlands, the benefit levels increased but
replacement rates declined. In Italy, the benefit level was reduced, but the replacement rate
increased between 1990 and 2009. Overall, the correlation between benefit level and replacement
rate was 0.7.
10. The coefficient for the long-term effects of the levels (Xi,t-1) are calculated by (U j/-b).
11. In most countries, the basic benefit rates are set at the national level. Yet, in a few (federal) countries, social assistance
standards vary slightly across regions. For these countries, the Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection
Dataset (Nelson 2013b) deals with this regional variation as follows. For Germany, the average of the social assistance
benefit levels guaranteed by the provinces is taken. For Sweden (until 1998) and Switzerland, benefit rates are based on
national guidelines. For Austria, Canada and Italy, the benefit rates refer to the benefit rates of Vienna, Ontario and
Milano respectively. The benefit rates in Michigan are used for the benefit rates of the United States. For Finland and
Japan, the benefit rates refer to the benefit rates of the regions with the highest benefit rates. See Nelson (2013b) for
more detail. For the countries where social assistance standards vary across regions, the indicators presented below give
only a limited indication of the benefit level. This limitation also applies to the regression analysis, as political and
institutional variables do not account for regional governments either.
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Lastly, for both indicators, the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation increased both
within and outside the EU. The diverging trend of minimum income benefit schemes is remarkable,
as convergence has been found for many other welfare state programmes (Caminada et al. 2010).
Regression results
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 2. First and foremost, both the Lisbon Strategy
2000 and the revised Lisbon Strategy 2005 are positively and significantly related to real minimum
income benefits and minimum income replacement rates. In line with our hypothesis, these results
suggest that the Lisbon Strategy 2000 and 2005 contributed to positive developments of minimum
income benefits.
Table 1. Real minimum income benefit levels and minimum income replacement rates, 1990-2009
Real minimum income benefit levels Minimum income replacement rates
1990 2000 2005 2009
change
1990-2009 1990 2000 2005 2009
change
1990-2009
Australia 12,231 13,870 16,163 16,874 4,643 47.8 45.7 45.3 40.9 6.9
Austria 10,545 11,311 11,601 12,398 1,853 43.4 43.5 43.7 44.4 1.0
Belgium 12,452 12,811 13,261 14,861 2,408 47.7 47.7 46.3 47.3 0.4
Canada 16,311 13,072 12,851 13,924 2,387 61.0 47.7 41.7 42.7 18.3
Denmark 10,806 16,594 17,955 18,247 7,441 53.2 67.2 64.6 61.7 8.5
Finland 13,158 9,548 10,192 10,263 2,895 58.6 46.0 41.2 39.0 19.6
France 7,195 8,474 8,721 9,090 1,895 40.6 40.6 39.1 38.0 2.5
Germany 9,239 9,640 11,724 11,998 2,760 36.6 33.6 38.3 36.9 0.3
Ireland 11,434 10,680 12,986 17,680 6,246 48.4 39.9 44.4 50.9 2.5
Italy 19,735 13,096 14,882 17,092 2,643 57.7 56.1 62.4 67.1 9.3
Japan 11,174 13,671 16,659 18,643 7,469 54.0 56.4 57.5 59.6 5.6
Luxembourg 13,877 19,422 21,977 27,923 14,047 46.7 56.9 59.7 72.2 25.5
Netherlands 14,723 14,998 14,841 17,179 2,456 59.3 55.3 48.8 51.7 7.6
New Zealand 10,096 9,736 10,854 11,417 1,321 50.8 42.5 43.1 38.0 12.9
Norway 9,250 13,938 13,507 12,819 3,570 39.7 51.7 45.1 41.9 2.1
Portugal . 5,542 6,071 6,787 . . 49.0 49.9 49.7 .
Spain 16,153 7,643 7,786 8,134 8,019 50.9 34.0 35.0 34.0 16.9
Sweden 11,081 8,756 9,468 9,775 1,306 60.9 44.4 43.1 38.7 22.2
Switzerland 11,145 12,654 11,497 11,637 492 38.7 41.4 32.9 30.8 8.0
United Kingdom 9,006 10,341 11,413 13,001 3,994 38.0 38.5 37.5 41.8 3.8
United States 9,623 7,956 7,805 7,497 2,126 35.0 26.8 24.6 22.5 12.5
Mean OECD-21 . 11,607 12,486 13,678 . . 45.9 45.0 45.2 .
Standard deviation . 3,295 3,769 4,896 . . 9.3 9.8 12.1 .
Coefficient of variation . 0.28 0.30 0.36 . . 0.20 0.22 0.27 .
Mean EU-14 . 11,347 12,349 13,888 . . 46.6 46.7 48.1 .
Standard deviation . 3,547 3,901 5,171 . . 9.1 9.4 11.8 .
Coefficient of variation . 0.31 0.32 0.37 . . 0.20 0.20 0.25 .
Note: Net benefits per year in US dollars, corrected for inflation (2005¼100) and PPP, simple average of minimum income
benefits of three household types: single person, lone parents with two children and two parents with two children. Data
years are around 1990 (Germany, 1991), and around 1995 (Portugal, 1996).
Source: Social Assistance and Minimum Income Levels and Replacement Rates Dataset (Wang and Van Vliet 2016b).
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Table 2. ECM regression results in 21 OECD countries, 1990-2009
Real minimum income benefits Minimum income replacement rates
Lisbon Strategy 2000 173.826*** 73.958 0.463*** 0.273
[3.51] [1.22] [2.66] [1.54]
Lisbon Strategy 2005 268.395*** 219.973*** 0.610*** 0.426**
[3.83] [3.11] [3.16] [2.53]
D Left government 1.979** 1.563 1.689* 0.005 0.004 0.004
[2.14] [1.59] [1.74] [1.36] [1.07] [1.19]
Left government (t-1) 0.055 0.02 0.03 0.000 0.000 0.001
[0.11] [0.04] [0.05] [0.21] [0.17] [0.31]
D Union density 16.642 6.917 9.085 0.176** 0.199** 0.191**
[0.68] [0.26] [0.34] [2.05] [2.32] [2.17]
Union density (t-1) 0.331 0.208 0.188 0.000 0.001 0.000
[0.30] [0.19] [0.17] [0.00] [0.15] [0.13]
D Unemployment 142.127*** 149.590*** 145.939*** 0.249*** 0.269*** 0.257***
[4.61] [4.49] [4.46] [2.68] [2.77] [2.62]
Unemployment (t-1) 25.139*** 29.697*** 28.155*** 0.043 0.054* 0.049
[4.51] [5.24] [4.84] [1.30] [1.69] [1.47]
D GDP per capita*10-3 52.565 73.939* 77.551* 0.001 0.037 0.047
[1.23] [1.68] [1.83] [0.01] [0.27] [0.34]
(GDP per capita)*10-3 (t-1) 8.456 5.597 6.11 0.009 0.018 0.015
[1.42] [1.00] [1.12] [0.52] [0.98] [0.79]
D Deindustrialisation 170.451*** 184.444*** 181.561*** 0.334*** 0.363*** 0.354***
[5.11] [5.24] [5.27] [2.60] [2.75] [2.72]
Deindustrialisation (t-1) 3.172 0.982 2.439 0.031 0.026 0.029
[0.57] [0.17] [0.43] [1.39] [1.18] [1.32]
D Trade openness 16.389*** 16.553*** 17.053*** 0.023 0.023 0.025
[3.32] [3.11] [3.36] [1.34] [1.26] [1.36]
Trade openness (t-1) 0.42 0.363 0.128 0.003 0.002 0.003
[0.57] [0.56] [0.18] [0.85] [0.75] [1.01]
D Capital openness 0.25 0.133 0.085 0.003 0.002 0.002
[0.53] [0.25] [0.17] [1.19] [1.05] [1.03]
Capital openness (t-1) 0.059 0.395 0.245 0.001 0.002 0.001
[0.10] [0.59] [0.39] [0.37] [0.63] [0.49]
Electoral system 82.111 95.152 86.501 0.263 0.286 0.27
[1.17] [1.34] [1.24] [1.05] [1.14] [1.08]
LDV 0.019 0.023* 0.02 0.018* 0.021** 0.019**
[1.39] [1.71] [1.49] [1.91] [2.14] [2.01]
Constant 248.159 235.369 300.915 3.398*** 3.461*** 3.567***
[0.66] [0.58] [0.77] [2.73] [2.75] [2.81]
N 364 364 364 364 364 364
Adj. R2 0.092 0.100 0.099 0.011 0.012 0.011
Note: Unstandardized coefficients, t statistics in the parentheses.
* significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01.
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Regarding domestic politics, the results indicate that left-wing governments are positively and
significantly associated with social assistance benefits in the short run. This result seems to suggest
that the general hypothesis that left-wing parties have a preference for more generous welfare
states also applies to social assistance benefits. However, this should be interpreted with caution, as
the coefficients for replacement rates and for the long-run are positive but insignificant. The results
for the role of trade unions are comparable in this respect. The positive and significant short-run
coefficient for replacement rates suggests that trade unions act as defenders of social assistance, as
they do for social insurance programmes. However, the evidence is weak, as the coefficients for the
benefit levels and the long-run are insignificant. The results for the electoral system are also
insignificant.
Turning to the socioeconomic variables, the effect of unemployment supports our hypothesis
that rising unemployment has been followed by retrenchment of social assistance benefits. Inter-
estingly, the coefficient for GDP per capita is strongly positive in the regressions for real minimum
income benefits, but is insignificant in the estimations of the replacement rate. One possible
explanation might be that although governments place more emphasis on social protection as
income increases, average wages increase as well, resulting in insignificant effects. Furthermore,
the results for deindustrialisation suggest that structural transformation of the labour market is
associated with higher social assistance benefits, although significant coefficients can only be
found for the short run. Finally, trade openness is negatively and significantly related to social
assistance benefits, which provides support for the efficiency hypothesis. The results for capital
openness are insignificant.
Sensitivity analyses
To examine the robustness of the results, we performed a number of sensitivity analyses. First of
all, the error correction models presented above do not explicitly control for country and year fixed
effects. To deal with the heterogeneity of the intercepts, we utilised fixed effect models. The
estimated equation is expressed as follows:
Yi;t ¼ a þ
X
bjXji;t1 þmiþltþ ei;t ð2Þ
Here, Yi,t is the level of the dependent variable, a refers to the intercept and Xi,t-1 denotes the
lagged level of the explanatory variables. We used a country dummy m and a year dummy l to
control for unobserved country- and year-specific effects. Furthermore, panel-corrected standard
errors were applied to correct for panel heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial correlation
(Beck and Katz 1995). A Prais-Winsten transformation was applied to correct for autocorrelation.
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 3. The coefficients for the Lisbon Strategy
2000 are not significant. The re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, on the other hand, showed
significantly positive coefficients. Taken together, these results indicate that we do not find robust
effects for the Lisbon Strategy 2000, whereas we do find robust results for the Lisbon Strategy
2005.
Furthermore, Table 3 shows that the results for left-wing parties and GDP per capita are robust.
In line with the results presented above, trade and capital openness yield a negative effect. Lastly,
the coefficients for union density, unemployment, deindustrialisation and the electoral system
were not significant or even significant in the opposite direction, indicating that the results for
these variables presented in Table 2 are not robust for the use of fixed effects.
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Finally, a number of other sensitivity analyses, reported in the online appendix, show that the
results are robust for the use of different household types, that the results are not driven by policy
changes in single countries, or that the results are not affected by enlargement of the EU or the
global financial crisis.
Conclusions
The literature on the Europeanisation of social protection has been mainly focused on labour
market policies. In contrast, far less research has been devoted to the relationship between the
Lisbon Strategy and developments of social assistance benefit schemes. In this study, we examined
the determinants of variations in the development of social assistance benefits across 21 OECD
countries over the period 1990-2009. The analysis focused, in particular, on the role of the Lisbon
Strategy that was adopted by the European Council to combat poverty and social exclusion across
Europe. The question is to what extent national policy changes can be ascribed to this strategy or,
in other words, whether we can see a Europeanisation of social assistance benefits. To analyse this
question, we used pooled time-series-cross-sectional regression analyses to examine the changes of
Table 3. Fixed effects regression results in 21 OECD countries, 1990-2009
Real minimum income benefits Minimum income replacement rates
Lisbon Strategy 2000 185.135 100.039 0.813 0.494
[0.92] [0.62] [0.78] [0.61]
Lisbon Strategy 2005 455.827** 436.256** 2.751*** 2.674***
[2.29] [2.13] [3.19] [3.08]
Left government (t-1) 3.191*** 3.167*** 3.153*** 0.004 0.004 0.004
[2.75] [2.79] [2.77] [0.92] [0.93] [0.91]
Union density (t-1) 112.759*** 112.124*** 112.365*** 0.02 0.003 0.000
[4.17] [4.08] [4.09] [0.24] [0.03] [0.00]
Unemployment (t-1) 79.912 76.511 78.632 0.251* 0.222 0.232
[1.60] [1.52] [1.55] [1.90] [1.58] [1.62]
(GDP per capita)*10-3 (t-1) 85.942* 88.239* 88.768* 0.078 0.057 0.054
[1.72] [1.78] [1.79] [0.44] [0.35] [0.33]
Deindustrialisation (t-1) 24.087 23.778 24.417 0.425** 0.395** 0.396**
[0.37] [0.36] [0.37] [2.16] [2.00] [2.01]
Trade openness (t-1) 25.388** 27.494** 27.894** 0.064** 0.085*** 0.088***
[2.21] [2.51] [2.50] [2.02] [2.92] [2.98]
Capital openness (t-1) 4.196** 4.126** 4.126** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011**
[2.49] [2.45] [2.45] [2.57] [2.43] [2.42]
Electoral system 409.547 388.596 378.922 0.639 0.452 0.473
[0.79] [0.69] [0.68] [0.29] [0.19] [0.20]
Constant 18073.488*** 18050.980*** 18109.425*** 82.709*** 81.673*** 81.883***
[3.58] [3.54] [3.56] [4.81] [4.75] [4.76]
N 369 369 369 369 369 369
Adj. R2 0.823 0.823 0.823 0.862 0.869 0.869
Note: Unstandardized coefficients, t statistics in parentheses, Prais-Winsten transformation [AR(1) disturbances].
* significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01.
Wang et al. 265
social assistance benefits after the launch of Lisbon Strategy, taking into account a number of
political, economic and institutional factors.
For the first years after the adoption of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, our analysis does not show
robust associations between the OMC Social Inclusion and national social assistance policy
reforms. This result is in line with existing case-study evidence (e.g. Graziano and Jessoula
2011). Interestingly, for the years after the re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, our analysis
suggests that the OMC Social Inclusion has been positively associated with the development of
social assistance benefits. This finding seems to indicate that the revision of the OMC Social
Inclusion has increased its effectiveness, which is in line with the goal of the revision.
Although the results of our study are robust for different model specifications and two different
indicators of social assistance benefits, we should note some important limitations of our analysis.
First, benefit levels and replacement rates provide an indication of only one dimension of social
assistance policies. Other institutional characteristics, such as the coverage rate, eligibility criteria,
work requirements and benefit sanctions, are also relevant, but were not taken into account. Future
research on welfare state indicators is required to quantify such policy dimensions. Second, an
alternative explanation for our result for the re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005 could be that
this effect (partly) reflects the impact of the Lisbon Strategy 2000, which needed a few years to
become effective. With our approach, it is not possible to isolate these effects completely. Third, a
more general limitation of our approach is that some institutional or socio-economic explanatory
factors that could be relevant for understanding developments in social assistance benefits are
difficult to capture in quantitative measures. This applies to the factors that were included in the
analysis, but perhaps even more to the factors that were not included in the analysis, such as trends
in social insurance and trends in deservingness or legitimacy regarding welfare state arrangements
(Cantillon et al. 2015, 2018). Fourth, for some of our explanatory factors, the results are not similar
for both indicators of social assistance benefits. Rather than only a measurement issue, this could
also reflect differences in theoretical mechanisms. Analysing these differences was beyond the
scope of this paper, but could be an interesting avenue for further research.
Lastly, a remaining question is how the interaction between EU coordination and national social
policies will progress given recent European developments. With the adoption of the Europe 2020
Strategy and the European Semester, the coordination of social policies is being further developed
(Bekker and Klosse 2013, Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014). Acknowledging the limitations of this study,
the results suggest that EU coordination can actually have an impact on domestic policy-making.
This is a relevant insight for the institutional design of future European initiatives on social policy, as
these initiatives will, in all likelihood, be based on legally non-binding means of governance.
Building on existing work (e.g. Weishaupt 2014b), further research should be devoted to the question
under which conditions specific governance instruments are more or less effective.
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